Abstract. In this paper we present a new type of signature for a group of persons, called a group signature, which has the following propertjes:
Introduction
In this paper we present a new type of signature, which will be illustrated with the following example:
A company has several computers, each connected to the local network. Each department of that company has its own printer (also connected to the network) and only persons of that department ate allowed to use their department's printer. Before printing, therefore. the printer must be convinced that the user is working in that department. At the same time, the company wants privacy: the user's name may not be revealed. If, however, someone discovers at the end of the day that a printer has been used too often, the director must be able to discover who misused that printer, to send him a bill.
More formally: a group of persons wants to create a signature scheme, which we will call a group signature scheme, that has the following thrce properties:
(i) only members of the group can sign messages;
(ii) the receiver of the signature can verify that it is a valid signature of that p u p , but cannot discover (iii) in case of dispute later on, the signature can be "opened" (with or without the help of the group which member of the group made it; members) to reveal the identity of the signer.
Group signatures are a "generalization" of credential mechanisms ([ChSS] ) and of membership (authentication) schemes (cf. he belongs to a certain group, without revealing his identity. In [00K90] and [SKI90], several of these schemes are proposed in which the same secret key is given to each group member. We define the following assumptions, Assumption 1. For each person ir is unfeasible to compute RSA roots (hence ir is unfeasible to split numbers thar are rhe product of some large primes; and it is unfeasible to compute discrere logarithms modulo a large composite number).
Assumption 2. For each person ir is unfeasible to compute the discrete logarithm modulo a large prime nwnber.
In this paper, only one group of persons will be considered (the hierarchical situation will not be treated here); and four different group signature schemes are presented. These schemes are compared.
Cryptographic assumption. In the first scheme every public key system can be used, the other schemes are based on Assumption 1 or 2. In all schemes (except in some modifications of the first scheme), the privacy of the signer is protected computationally. Not even a person from the group can determine who made a certain signature (except of course for the person who made that signature). Care must of course be taken in the selection of the exponents used in order to protect the anonymity of the signer. See Section 6.
Trusted authorio. Let 2 be a trusted authority, which sets the group signature scheme ( it may be possible to distribute the power of 2). Except for the first scheme, 2 is no longer needed after the setup.
In the last scheme, a group signature scheme can be created from a "normal" setup, without a trusted authority.
Creation of the group. In the first two schemes the group of persons is fixed in advance. In the last two schemes, it is assumed that there is already a setup, based on RSA or discrete logarithm. If in these schemes someone wants to sign a message without revealing his name, then at rhat moment he creates some group of persons (for instance by picking them from a Trusted Public Directory of public keys) and proves that he belongs to that group. In case of dispute later on, the other ''group members" are able to deny that signature.
Type of signamre. In the last three schemes, the signatures made by the group members are undeniable signatures, but it is possible to make digital signatures. This can be realized as in [FSM], by doing the k iterations of the confinnation protocol in parallel and let the recipient choose the challenge vector not randomly, but as the outcome of a one-way-function on the received numbers. Because this protocol is no longer zero-knowledge, the signature and the confirnation protocol together will be a digital signature. Still to be proven is that this parallel protocol gives "no useful knowledge" to the recipient.
Costs. In all schemes the length of the public key (i.e., the number of bits of the group's public key) is linear in the number of group members. The numbers of bits and of computations are only compared in the case of the confirmation protocol, because in one disavowal protocol, these numbers are independent of the number of group members. We have not taken into account the looking-up of some public keys in a Trusted Public Directory. 2. First group signature scheme 2 chooses a public key system, gives each person a list of secret keys (these lists are all disjunct) and publishes the complete list of corresponding public keys (in random order) in a Trusted Public Directory.
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Each person can sign a message with a secret key from his list, and the recipient can verify this signature with the corresponding public key from the public list. Each key will be used only once, otherwise signatures created with that key are linked. 2 knows all the lists of secret keys, so that in case of dispute, he knows who made the disputed signature. Hence Z i s needed for the setup and for "opening" a signature.
If each person gets the same number of secret keys, then the length of the public key of this group signature scheme (i.e. the length of the Trusted Public Directory) is linear in the number of persons; but the number of messages a person can sign is futed.
A problem with this scheme is that 2 knows all the secret keys of the group members and can therefore also create signatures. This can be prevented by using blinded public keys. Let the public key system used be based on Assumption 2: for instance the ElGamal scheme [ElG85] or the undeniable signature scheme [CvA89] . Let g be a generator of the multiplicative group Z;, where p is a prime.
Group member i creates his own secret key si and gives gsi (modp) to 2. Thus 2 has a list of all these public keys together with the group member's name. Each week 2 gives each group member i a randomly chosen number r i E (1, ...,p-1) and publishes the list of all the blinded public keys (gsi)ri.
During this week group member i will use siq (modp -1) as secret key.
The advantages of this modification are that 2 cannot fake signatures, and that each group member only has to have one "really secret key" (for instance in a smart card), which can be blinded in order to make other secret keys. Only the one week's signatures can be linked, so that each group member can have only a few secret keys in his smart card to prevent this linking. If an ri is accidentally revealed, still no more information about the secret key si is revealed.
In another modification, no trusted authority is needed: each user untraceably sends one (or more) public keys to a public list, which will be the public key of the group. But only group members must be able to send public keys to that list.
Second group signature scheme
Zchooses two different large primes p , q together with a one-way-functionfof which the outcome may be assumed to be coprime with N=pq. Z gives person i of the group a secret key si. which is a large prime randomly chosen from the set (O=(rfil, ..., L2fiJ-l), computes v = nsi, and publishes N,v and$ If group member i wants to sign messagen, his signature will be ( j ( n ) ) s i mod N .
and he has to prove to the recipient that silv and that sic@, without revealing anything more about si (see Section 3.1). In case of dispute later on, the recipient can perform a confirmatioddisavowal protocol with each group member, without the help of 2 (see Section 3.2). To prove the security of these schemes we need Assumption 1.
Confirmation protocol
We first consider the following instance, which is solved by [BCDvdG87] by using Protocol 1, which uses computationally secure blobs B.
PS secret : c. public If this protocol is iterated k times. ?/ will be convinced (with probability l-2-k) that ccfi=(a-p,..., a+2P), but 2/ will receive no knowledge other than the fact that CER = { a,. . . ,a+p) +. (3) T sends ?/in case sends the unorderedpair (2?(zl), 'E(z2)) to 2! b=O: r and opens both blobs. b=l: 7 which is (c+r) or (c+r-p), whichever is in the set R, and opens respectively the blob on z1 or 22 (which is called i). If CE R, then the distribution of F is uniform over R and is thus independent of c. W i t h this protocol we will create a confirmation protocol, so let T be a fixed group member who wants to convince the recipient (verifier @ that he gave him a valid signature S. So the following instance (in which we write rn in stead off(n)) has to be solved: 
Protocol 2. (for Instance 2)
Step 1. Prove the knowledge of s such that S m" (rnodN) and that s e a with Protocol 1, iterated k
Step 2. Prove that sIv as follows times (take Q=O, x=m, y== and c=s) . Step 1 of this protocol was already proven to be sound, complete, and zero-knowledge.
Prover
Step 2 is trivially complete and m k n o w l e d g e (the blobs B are computationally secure zero-knowledge). Because in Step 1 it is proved that S 1 m', one can easily see that it is feasible to compute b=(rn')" from (~, v , a = ( d )~ ] if and only if sIv (under the assumption that it is unfeasible to compute RSA roots. so here we use that N is not a prime). Hence
Step 2 is also sound. 0
Disavowal protocol
If !€' want s to prove to ?.' that S is not his signature on m. the following instance has to be solved N,v,m,S,4 m,SE Zk.
Instance 3.
There are no zero-knowledge disavowal protocols to prove that ax 3jY (modN) 
Some remarks on this group signature scheme
If all group members except one conspire, the secret key of that one person is revealed. This threat can be easily eliminated if the authority 2 makes himself a member of the group, i.e., if 2 computes v as v = sz . nsi , where sz is a secret key only known to 2. With this mck, the group can also consist of two members.
The number of bits of the public key v is linear in the number of persons, so raising a number to the power v will take a time linear in the number of group members.
The set @ can also be chosen in other ways, but it must satisfy the following conditions. If @=[rp, ...., cpl+rp2)cIN,then l,N,cp:e4,=(qr,-% ,..., ~+ 2 % ) . T h e first conditionisnecessary to avoid the use of s=l. According to the last condition the following conspiracy attack is avoided if two group members, say i and j , conspire, they can create signatures S I msisi, which they can both disavow later. But six, Q 6, so this signature will not be accepted in Step 1 of Protocol 2. Hence also the choice of v/s or v as exponent in the signature is avoided.
The blob ' B can be implemented in the following way: 2 chooses generators g, and h, of n; and Z i respectively, and constructs with the use of the Chinese Remainder Theorem g 1 1' modg and h = ih, modq . So <g,h> generates ZL uniformly, but it reveals the factorization of N . Therefore he chooses integers ul,u2,bl satisfying gcd(u1,q.p -l)=gcd(*,h.q -l)=gcd(q& -+ q .~(~) ) = l and publishes g = gqha2 and = g4hb2. It is not difficult to see also that < g , i > generates the whole group Z ; uniformly, if the exponents are chosen from (1, ..., (C(N) ). Hence, in order for T to make m), he chooses rl,r2E (1, ...A) andcreates m) as ygrlhr* (mod N).
Another method of implementation is the following: T chooses randomly k numbers g, ,. . .& from { 1, ..., N ) . Then with high probability <gl, ..&> generates Zk nearly uniformly. for k sufficiently large. In this case no trusted centre is needed [Ch87].
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Third group signature scheme
For the security of this scheme we need Assumption 1, and we assume that there is a Trusted Public Directory in which each person's RSA modulus is listed (the public RSA exponent is not needed in this group signature scheme).
The secret key of group member i will be the factorization of his own RSA modulus Ni = piqi.
During the setup, 2 chooses an RSA-modulus N , which is independent of all the Nils. Let M be a public integer such that pi~a=(rll;i?l,...,L2~1-1) and qi>4&
(for all 0. If person i wants to sign message n, he chooses randomly some set r of persons (including himself); his signature will be and he has to give a zero knowledge proof that the used exponent pie@ and that pi is a divisor of the product of the RSA moduli of the persons of r. This can be done with Protocol 2 (with *a), because N i > q i > 4 m and thus all moduli, every product of two prime divisors of different moduli and each qi are no elements of &=(r&d, ..., L3ll;i?jl. Hence the exponent used in the signature must be p i . If a group member wants to deny a signature, he can use Protocol 3.
Fourth group signature scheme
The fourth group signature scheme is based on Assumption 2. Let p be a large public prime and let g,h be public generators of Zi. Person i has a secret key si and a public key ki 3 gsi (modp). If person i wants to sign message m=An), he randomly chooses some set r of persons (including himself); and his signature will be and he has to give a zero-knowledge proof that the secret exponent used in that signature is also used in the public key of somebody of the group r, i.e. the protocol has to solve the following instance:
Instance 4. public : p , g , w , r .
To prove this, T uses the following protocol, which gives no additional information about i and si.
We have compressed the proofs that S is of the correct form, that the exponents used in S and in some public key are the same, and that the public key is used by somebody in r into one protocol. rI+si, r2+ri, 4+si and index qi).
that the numbers x,y,zl ,. . .,zn are formed correctly. that yS E mr3''' (modp) and thur xz,(,) 1 Sh"+'; (g/m)'""' (modp).
(4) "verifies in cuse
If P can answer both questions, then he knows si; it is easy to see that this s i satisfies S i rnsi and ki = gsn. Hence if this protocol is iterated k times, then 2/will be convinced with confidence 1-2-&. This protocol is also zero-knowledge because it can be simulated (with the same probability distributions) by:
(1) Choose apemutarion ~o f r , numbers rl ,... ,rln,fl.~Z,t3~ ( 1 ,..., p-I) andee (0.1).
Compute and send the numbers: z s ( j ) =k,hrj (modp) &I-), y=m'J / S c (modp) a n d x a ( , , , ) , s ' h' 2 ( s / z r ( i ) ) e (modp). Can the results of [SSW] and [Per851 be applied to show that specific choices of the exponents in the schemes of Sections 2-4 and 5 , respectively, protect anonymity in ways equivalent to known computational problems? Is it possible to modify the fourth group signature system in such a way that the number of transmitted bits during the confirmation protocol is independent of the number of group members?
